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2 
The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data 
 
Abstract 
 
To increase inward foreign direct investment (FDI), policy-makers increasingly resort 
to the ratification of double taxation treaties (DTTs). However, the effectiveness of 
DTTs in inducing higher FDI is still open to debate, as the empirical evidence of 
existing studies is anything but conclusive. In contrast to earlier approaches, we use a 
largely unpublished dataset on bilateral FDI stocks, covering a much larger and more 
representative sample of host and source countries. Controlling for standard 
determinants of FDI and employing various econometric specifications, our results 
indicate that DTTs do lead to higher FDI stocks and that the effects are substantively 
important as well. 
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1. Introduction 
To increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in their country is a desirable policy goal 
for most policy-makers. Yet, often the factors influencing the influx of FDI are not 
easily amenable to policy, either because they are unalterable, like natural endowment 
of physical resources, and cultural and geographic proximity to major source 
countries, or because changing them is a very long-term process, as in the case of the 
efficiency of political institutions, market size, or the education and productivity of 
the local labour force. However, there are still a number of measures which can be 
taken to compete in the rivalry for foreign investment: on the one hand, restrictions 
imposed on investors regarding, e.g., the profit repatriation can be unilaterally eased, 
red tape or corporate taxes can be reduced, and on the other hand, bilateral measures 
can be taken, such as concluding bilateral investment treaties (BIT) or double taxation 
treaties (DTT).1 
The question addressed in this paper is whether the conclusion of a DTT leads 
to more bilateral FDI between the two respective countries. If existent, this benefit 
could compensate for the costs attached to DTTs. Besides the costs of negotiating and 
ratifying the contract and giving up some fiscal sovereignty, there could also be a loss 
in tax revenues for at least one of the signing parties. This is particularly important 
from the point of view of developing countries as most treaties favour residence-based 
over source-based taxation.2 
We are of course not the first to analyse the effect of DTTs on FDI. However, 
our major original contribution to this literature is that we overcome two limitations 
                                                 
1
 There are a multitude of different names for double taxation treaties such as double taxation 
agreements, capital tax treaties, tax treaties, or treaties covering the taxation of investment and income.  
2
 It is important to clarify that the residence (or home) country is the state where the enterprise has its 
domicile, whereas the host country is the state where the foreign investment takes places and thus 
where the income is generated. For this reason, the latter is also referred to as the source country in the 
context of taxation, whereas in the context of FDI, the source country denotes the home country of the 
multinational enterprise (MNE). 
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of existing studies. These have either suffered from the absence of information on 
bilateral FDI, using instead aggregate FDI in a large and representative monadic 
country year sample (Di Giovanni 2005; Neumayer 2007), or, where they used 
bilateral FDI data, they have suffered from a small and unrepresentative dyad year 
sample (Davies 2003, 2004; Blonigen and Davies 2004, 2005; Egger et al. 2006; 
Coupé, Orlova and Skiba 2008). This applies in particular to the large number of 
developing countries, which are hardly covered in the estimations. Instead, we test the 
effect of DTTs on FDI in a dyadic country dataset, in which both developed and 
developing countries are very broadly represented over a long period of time. We find 
that DTTs increase the bilateral FDI stock between 27 and 31 percent. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the next section 
discusses the benefits and costs to the contracting partners of concluding DTTs. 
Section 3 presents trends in the development and coverage of DTTs, demonstrating 
that not only have DTTs become increasingly popular, but also their geographical 
coverage has extended to include many developing countries. Section 4 reviews 
existing studies, which have examined the effect of DTTs on FDI and discusses their 
shortcomings. Section 5 explicates our research design, section 6 reports results from 
the main estimations and robustness tests, while section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The benefits and costs of Double Taxation Treaties 
Double taxation is generally defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in at least 
two countries on the same taxpayer with respect to the same subject matter and for 
identical periods (OECD 2005). This may occur if one country claims taxing authority 
based on the residence or the citizenship of the taxpayer, while another country 
postulates taxing authority based on where the income originates. Another potential 
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source of twofold taxation could be the fact that both countries claim either a certain 
taxpayer as a resident or that an income arises within its country (Doernberg 2004). 
Also, different methods for the determination of the internal transfer price applied in 
two states can lead to a double taxation, e.g., a company has a production facility in 
two countries and delivers intermediate goods from the plant in country A to the 
factory in country B. If domestic rules in B set a value of 80 USD as appropriate, but 
country A ascertains a value of 100 USD, then revenues of 100 USD in the source 
country stand vis-à-vis expenses of only 80 USD in the recipient country (Lang 2002). 
Even though measures to prevent double taxation can be implemented 
unilaterally, countries have on a very large scale resorted to the conclusion of DTTs. 
By burdening economic activity in a foreign country twice, double taxation is often 
believed to have a negative effect on the total amount of FDI as well as on the 
allocation of FDI across countries. In the words of Egger et al. (2006: 902): “One of 
the most visible obstacles to cross border investment is the double taxation of foreign-
earned income.” One major purpose of DTTs is thus the encouragement of FDI. Tax 
relief to foreign investors from double taxation is not the only purpose of DTTs, 
however. Another important purpose is the exchange of information. DTTs help to 
combat tax evasion and tax avoidance and to prevent double non-taxation by making 
information from one contracting state available to the other contract partner. In 
principle, these other aspects of DTTs could discourage FDI. 
In addition, also other regulations, calculation methods and definitions are 
harmonised in a tax treaty, mitigating the uncertainty an investor faces when dealing 
with foreign fiscal systems and lessening the administrative effort. The tax authorities 
of either country profit from this harmonisation, as the variety of different legislations 
they have to deal with is reduced. Closely related to the anti-tax-avoidance objective 
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of exchanging information and setting rules for transfer-price calculation is the 
argument that DTTs may help to reduce harmful international tax competition from 
tax havens. Even though tax treaties are an insufficient measure (due to their bilateral 
character) to completely avoid harmful tax competition (Toumi 2006), they contain 
some regulations to at least mitigate the problem: the permanent establishment rule 
and the provisions against treaty shopping limit the circle of beneficiaries and curb 
(along with the transfer pricing restrictions) the opportunities to channel income 
through tax havens (OECD 1998).3 Lastly, similar to BITs, the benefits of concluding 
DTTs may go beyond any concrete treaty provision in that countries may acquire 
“international economic recognition” (Dagan 2000: 32) or, in the words of 
Rosenbloom (1982, cited in Reese 1987: 380), a “badge of international economic 
respectability” with a dense network of DTTs. 
Against these benefits of DTTs, there are also a number of costs to the 
contracting parties. Negotiating and ratifying the contract ties up administrative 
resources. Given the length and labour intensity of the negotiation process, and the 
additional effort of matching versions in different languages, the costs can be 
substantial, especially, but not only, for smaller or developing countries.4 The 
provisions in the treaty may conflict with domestic tax law which has to be adapted as 
a consequence. Here, the national fiscal sovereignty is curtailed.  
The most important cost factor is the potential loss of tax revenue since DTTs 
regularly favour residence over source taxation. Due to the reciprocity of FDI flows, 
benefits offered to investors from the contracting partner in one country should, in 
                                                 
3
 However, another perspective is that a wide treaty network has the unintentional consequence of 
opening up the benefits of harmful preferential tax regimes offered by treaty partners (OECD 1998). 
The OECD advises countries against entering DTTs with tax havens (OECD 1998). 
4
 Shelton (2004) points out that the negotiation of the Netherlands-US treaty took more than ten years 
and consumed probably several person-years of work. As of April 2003, Mauritius, a country with a 
population of just 1,200,000 had been in the process of negotiating or finalising treaties with 16 
countries. 
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theory, be compensated by the same benefits given to that country’s own investors in 
the other contracting state. This is because a country serves as both a host and a 
residence country for foreign investment at the same time. However, especially FDI 
flows and stocks between developing and developed countries are highly asymmetric, 
as developing countries are mainly net-capital importers. Entering a DTT therefore 
often leads to a loss of tax revenue in developing countries (Easson 2000). 
 
3. Trends in the development and coverage of DTTs 
Earlier historical treaties notwithstanding, the first model DTT was published in 1928, 
by a Group of Experts which had been convoked by the League of Nations in 1921. 
Even though since then the international tax legislation has become considerably 
more complex, the commentaries more extensive and some tax loopholes have had to 
be closed, this model treaty still forms the basis for all DTTs in force today (Graetz 
and O’Hear 1997). 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of the annual average of new treaty 
conclusions, treaty terminations and the number of total treaties in force. The pace of 
treaty conclusion has increased tremendously over the last decades: from an annual 
average of nearly 18 new conventions during the 1960s, to 58 DTTs per year in the 
1980s, more than 80 in the 1990s, and reaching a peak with 117 newly concluded 
treaties in 1998. Since then, the expansion has lost some momentum, but has 
remained at a high average of 92 new DTTs per annum in 2004 to 2007. Noteworthy 
is the fact that the number of terminated treaties jumped up at the end of the 1980s. 
However, this cannot be interpreted as a renunciation of bilateral cooperation, since 
most of the terminated treaties were substituted by a renegotiated contract. Radaelli 
(1997) argues that these new contracts more strongly emphasize the role of tax 
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treaties in avoiding tax evasion through transfer pricing, or guard more strictly against 
treaty shopping.5 
 
insert figure 1 around here 
 
A comprehensive worldwide network of bilateral tax treaties would require 
more than 18,000 DTTs.6 However, the 2,351 treaties concerning the taxation of 
income and capital which were in force at the end of 2007 encompass nearly all 
OECD countries and cover a very large proportion of global FDI flows and stocks. 
Figure 2 shows the regional distribution of treaties concluded by the end of 2006.7 
Developed countries are involved as a signatory in 74 percent of all DTTs, with either 
developing countries (38 percent), another developed country (24 percent) or a 
transition economy (12 percent) representing the contracting partner. South-South 
treaties account for 16 percent of all treaties in force, while treaties involving a 
developing and a transition country represent 12 percent. Finally, only 80 DTTs (3 
percent) were concluded between countries of the CIS and South-East Europe. 
 
insert figure 2 around here 
 
4. Existing studies on DTTs and FDI 
As mentioned in the introduction, existing empirical studies either suffer from a 
narrow and non-representative sample size when using bilateral FDI data or need to 
                                                 
5
 Radaelli focuses on US treaties; however, since most treaties contain some anti-abuse provisions, this 
assessment should apply elsewhere as well.  
6
 Calculation based on 192 UN members. The exact figure depends on the number of independent tax 
authorities. 
7
 This chart includes also some DTTs other than treaties on income and capital, which are the focus of 
this article. 
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resort to aggregate FDI data in order to achieve a large, representative sample size. 
Starting with the dyadic literature first, Davies (2003) examines the impact of treaty 
renegotiations over the period 1966 to 2000 on both inbound and outbound US FDI. 
During this period, 20 treaty renegotiations took place. On the whole, Davies finds 
that DTT renegotiations had no effect on FDI.8 One limitation of the study is sample 
selection: on the one hand, with one exception, all treaty renegotiations took place 
with developed countries. On the other hand, only US FDI activity is examined. This 
is even more critical, since the US is notorious for its strictness in insisting on anti-tax 
avoidance and information exchange provisions in treaty renegotiations.  
Focussing on US inward and outward investment stocks, Blonigen and Davies 
(2004) examine the influence of a DTT conclusion on the size of bilateral FDI. The 
dataset contains 88 partner countries over up to 20 years from 1980 through 1999. 
Their analysis differentiates between new and old treaties, the former being concluded 
before the sample period, the latter from 1981 onwards. The authors argue that an 
endogeneity problem (DTTs may be correlated with unobserved variables and 
therefore correlated with the error term) is more likely to occur with old treaty 
partners, since the US tends to conclude DTTs with important partner countries such 
as Western European countries, at an early stage. Similar to Davies (2003), Blonigen 
and Davies (2004) find that DTTs have no positive effect on inward or outward FDI. 
The degree to which this result can be generalised is again limited since the scope of 
the sample is confined to US investments. 
Blonigen and Davies (2005) broaden their research by using OECD data on 
bilateral FDI stocks and flows covering 23 developed source countries over the period 
of 1982-1992. They find a positive relationship between the existence of a DTT and 
                                                 
8
 Davies (2004) comes to similar conclusions. 
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higher FDI stocks and flows in OLS estimation. Compared to a situation without a tax 
treaty, a DTT is accompanied by a 2.5 bn USD higher FDI stock in the host country 
and a 234 m USD higher inflow, respectively.9 In order to address the endogeneity 
problem, the authors distinguish between new and old treaties. The impact of old 
treaties remains positive with even higher coefficients than in the aggregate 
estimation, whereas the new treaties have a negative – but not statistically significant 
– influence. Deploying a fixed-effects estimation, the coefficient for new treaties stays 
negative and is now significant at the 5 percent level, revealing a 2.6 bn USD 
decrease in FDI stock and a 315 m USD decrease in FDI flows.10  
The reservations toward the earlier studies still apply: the sample has been 
expanded beyond U.S. FDI, but it remains restricted in terms of country coverage (no 
developing source countries and a limited range of developing host countries) and 
timeframe, which does not cover the boom of FDI activity during the 1990s. 
Furthermore, only 3 percent of the country pairs concluded a treaty during the 
examination period (compared to 74 percent with old treaties), raising the issue of a 
potential sample selection bias if the selected countries share certain characteristics 
which are not captured in the control variables.  
Egger et al. (2006) estimate the effect of tax treaties on bilateral outward FDI 
from OECD source countries over the period of 1985-2000 with a two-step selection 
model. Arguing that treaty conclusion is an endogenous event, they presume a self-
selection into the treatment group, i.e. the group of country-pairs between which a 
DTT is in force. This treatment group covers 67 observations, while the control group 
                                                 
9
 This magnitude appears to be very high, taking into account a sample mean of 3.4 bn USD outbound 
stocks and 283 m USD outflows, respectively. 
10
 Since the fixed-effects (FE) estimator only uses the variation within each country pair, time invariant 
variables, and thus also the old-treaty variable, cannot be estimated separately. Interestingly, the 
negative coefficient can be seen as an argument against potential reverse causality, since there is no 
obvious reason why higher FDI activity should lead to less DTTs. 
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without treaties encompasses 719 observations. In a first step, the authors estimate the 
propensity of a specific country pair to enter a DTT with a probit model. In the second 
step, they conduct a difference-in-difference estimation, using the difference between 
the two-year average of FDI-log after and the biannual average prior to treaty 
conclusion as the dependent variable. Using different criteria (e.g., similar propensity 
to sign a DTT) for assorting, the same calculation method is applied to the control 
group. Comparing the difference of FDI stock for the treaty group with the difference 
of a similar control group, one can estimate the average effect of the treatment. Egger 
et al. find a negative effect of DTTs on FDI. 
Coupé, Orlova and Skiba (2008) concentrate their research on the influence of 
both BITs and DTTs on the FDI flows from OECD into transition economies, 
covering 17 source and nine host economies over the period of 1990-2001. No 
consistent results are found as the sign and statistical significance of the estimated 
treaty coefficients depend largely on the estimator used (OLS, random effects, fixed 
effects, two-stage least squares). 
Turning toward studies, which use aggregate rather than bilateral FDI data in 
larger and more representative samples, Di Giovanni (2005) examines the impact of 
various macroeconomic and financial variables on cross-border M&A activities as a 
component of FDI over the period from 1990 to 1999, covering 193 countries. He 
finds that a DTT is accompanied by increased cross-border acquisition activities. 
Neumayer (2007) estimates the effect of DTTs on FDI to developing countries, using 
both dyadic outbound FDI stocks from the US, as well as the total inbound FDI stocks 
of developing countries and the FDI inflows to developing countries as dependent 
variables. The former dataset encompasses data from 1970 to 2001 and 114 host 
countries, the latter dataset covers 120 host countries from 1970 on for the FDI flows 
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and from 1980 on for the stocks, respectively. The effect of a DTT conclusion with 
the US is measured by a dummy variable; however, since the other FDI data are in 
aggregate form and are thus non-dyadic, the explanatory variable is replaced by the 
cumulative number of DTTs the specific country has signed with OECD countries, 
weighted by the OECD country’s share of FDI outward flows relative to total world 
outward FDI flow. Regarding the US data, Neumayer finds that the existence of a 
DTT is associated with a 22 percent higher FDI outbound stock in fixed effects 
estimations. The positive impact is confirmed in the non-dyadic dataset, suggesting 
that countries with a higher number of cumulative DTTs have both a higher FDI stock 
as well as higher FDI inflows. Separating the data in two subsamples of low and 
middle income developing countries, the positive effect is only found for the latter 
group.  
In conclusion, the studies that employ bilateral FDI data by and large fail to 
find a positive effect of DTTs on FDI. However, their major limitation is the small 
and non-representative sample size. The couple of studies that employ aggregate FDI 
data in a large and representative sample come to the opposite conclusion: DTTs 
increase FDI. In this study, we will analyze whether this positive effect carries over to 
bilateral FDI data once a large and representative country sample is employed. 
 
5. Research Design 
The dependent variable 
Given that we employ dyadic fixed effects estimation throughout, which is 
exclusively based on the within-variation in the data, measuring FDI in stocks rather 
than flows is more appropriate (Egger and Merlo 2007). We use absolute FDI stocks 
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rather than FDI stocks as a share of a country’s GDP since the latter measure would 
capture the relative importance of FDI to the host country, but not FDI stocks directly. 
Our main innovation and contribution to the existing literature on DTTs and FDI is 
the use of dyadic FDI stock data for a large and representative sample covering both 
developed and developing countries. Our sample covers 30 FDI source countries, of 
which 10 are developing countries, and 105 FDI host countries, of which 84 are 
developing countries. The appendix lists the countries included in the sample. 
To achieve such a large and representative sample of dyadic FDI, we 
undertook a number of steps. Most importantly, we purchased FDI stock data from 
UNCTAD (2008), which are not publicly available. Our starting point is the bilateral 
inward FDI stock. For those dyads, which do not report any inward FDI stock data, 
but report outward FDI stock data, we reversed these to fill in missing inward FDI 
stock data. Where they overlap, inward and reversed outward FDI stock data are very 
highly correlated at r = 0.86. The combined FDI stock data from UNCTAD were then 
combined with publicly available data from OECD (2008), for the relatively small 
share of dyads for which UNCTAD does not report data. Where they overlap, data 
from the two sources are very highly correlated (both instock and reversed outstock 
data from both sources are correlated at r = 0.99 with each other). For around half of 
all dyads in our sample, there are no reported FDI stock data at any point of time. We 
have set the FDI stock to zero for these dyads if there are no reported FDI flow data at 
any point of time for these country pairs either. The reason is that in these cases we 
can be fairly confident that there are no, or virtually no, bilateral FDI stocks existent. 
This mainly affects dyads between some developing countries, but also some dyads 
between one of the medium-sized or small developed countries and small developing 
countries. 
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We take the natural log of FDI stocks.11 Doing so allows an easy interpretation 
of estimated coefficients as elasticities and, more importantly, reduces skewness of 
the dependent variable, which increases the model fit substantially. Note that we use 
FDI stock data in nominal USD, since there is no adequate deflator available for FDI 
in many developing countries. Using the US deflator instead is likely to bias the 
results (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). We therefore use year-specific time dummy 
variables in all estimations. They also account for any trends in total FDI that affect 
all dyads equally. 
The analysis covers the period from 1978 to 2004. While UNCTAD’s Data 
Extract Service provides FDI data since 1970, very few countries report FDI stocks 
for the early or mid-1970s at a bilateral level. As a consequence we start with 1978, 
thereby avoiding any biases arising from an extremely small sample of reporting 
countries in the early periods. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Our explanatory variable of main interest is the presence of a DTT. Existing studies 
differ in that some take the year of signature (e.g., Neumayer 2007), while others take 
the year of ratification as the treaty’s start period (e.g., Coupé, Orlova and Skiba 
2008). The DTT signature date is usually referred to as the date of conclusion. The 
treaty partners commit themselves to arrange the procedures necessary under 
domestic law for the final conclusion of the treaty. However, to enter into force, the 
treaty must be ratified by the parliaments or heads of state of the contracting states 
and a formal exchange or deposit of the instruments of ratification has to take place. 
From this point on, the states are bound to honour the terms of the treaty. Yet, the 
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 We set the very small number of observations with negative FDI stocks equal to 0.1 before taking the 
log. The same applies to the larger number of observations with zero FDI stocks. 
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most important date is in fact when the provisions become effective, which is 
specified in one of the last articles of the treaty and is typically January, 1 of the year 
following ratification. Because the date of effectiveness is what matters most to 
foreign investors, we take the year of effectiveness as the start of the DTT (taken from 
IBFD 2008). The binary DTT variable is labelled dtt_dummy. 
As control variables, we include the following set of standard determinants of FDI 
often employed in the empirical literature: 
• The log of total host GDP in (nominal) USD (lnGDP), taken from World Bank 
(2006), to control for market size, which is expected to have a positive influence 
on FDI (market-seeking FDI). 
• The log of host GDP per capita in (nominal) USD (lnGDPpc), taken from World 
Bank (2006), to control for the mean purchasing power of domestic consumers. 
• The log of the inflation rate in the host country in percent, measured by the GDP 
deflator (lnInflation), taken from World Bank (2006), as a proxy for 
macroeconomic distortions, suggesting a negative impact on FDI. 
• Ratio of sum of imports and exports to GDP in the host country (Trade openness) 
from World Bank (2006), to control for openness of trade. Since a considerable 
part of international trade is intra-industry trade, a positive sign is expected. 
Furthermore, openness to trade may serve as a proxy for general openness towards 
foreigners and for a positive attitude towards globalisation.  
• A dummy is included taking the value of one, if the home and host country have 
signed a common regional trade agreement (RTA), which is either a customs 
union or a free trade agreement (Source: WTO 2007). A positive sign is expected.  
• The binary variable bit_dummy controls for the existence of a bilateral investment 
treaty (Source: UNCTAD 2007a). By entering such a treaty, the host country 
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commits itself to meeting various obligations regarding the protection of 
investments, e.g., “fair and equal treatment”, “full protection and security”, or 
“protection against unreasonable or discriminatory measures” (Salacuse and 
Sullivan 2000: 82-83). Also, provisions are agreed upon for the settlement of 
investment disputes. Such a contract reduces uncertainty and should therefore 
foster FDI (Neumayer and Spess 2005; Busse, Königer and Nunnenkamp 2008). 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive summary variable statistics. 
 
insert table 1 around here 
 
Estimation technique 
In our main estimations, we use a dyadic fixed-effects estimator, i.e. each dyad of 
countries has its own intercept. One advantage is that all factors that a country pair 
has in common and that are time-invariant (common border, language, geographical 
distance, historical ties, etc.) are automatically controlled for. Dyad fixed effects also 
automatically exclude all “old treaties”, that is, treaties that were concluded before the 
start of our estimation period (1978), from having an effect on the estimation results 
since dyads with such treaties have no within variation in the treaty dummy variable. 
Far from representing a nuisance of fixed-effects estimation, this exclusion of old 
treaties actually represents an advantage because it deals with the problem that older 
treaties are more likely to be correlated with unobserved variables and therefore 
endogenous, i.e. correlated with the error term. We use standard errors that are fully 
robust toward arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (i.e., standard errors are 
clustered on dyads). 
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In robustness tests, we also use Arellano and Bond’s (1991) general method of 
moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator. Our T is relatively large, which gives a 
very large number of potential instruments. Using too many instruments can bias the 
estimation results (Roodman 2007). Unfortunately, it is not clear what constitutes too 
many. We follow Roodman’s (2007) advice to restrict the number of lags to a 
maximum of medium length and to check the robustness of results toward increasing 
and decreasing the lag length. We have therefore restricted the use of lagged 
instruments to a total maximum of six, but our results are robust toward using the full 
instrument set as well as using instruments up to a total maximum of four lags. 
 
6. Results 
Table 2 presents our main estimation results. We start with a static model, i.e. a 
model, in which no lagged dependent variable is included (column 1). We briefly 
discuss results on the control variables first. With the exception of trade openness, 
which has the expected positive coefficient sign, but is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, all variables have statistically significant coefficients in line with 
expectation. Host countries with larger economies, higher per capita income as well as 
lower inflation rates and which have concluded a BIT with the source country receive 
more FDI from this country. Our variable of main interest, dtt_dummy, has the 
expected positive and statistically significant coefficient. In order to interpret its 
substantive importance, one needs to take into account the necessary correction for 
the estimated variance for dummy variable coefficients in semi-logarithmic equations 
(see Kennedy 1981). The estimated average effect of concluding a DTT is to increase 
FDI stocks by around 27.3 percent. 
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Egger and Merlo (2007) argue that static models tend to over-estimate the 
effect of BITs (and, by implication, DTTs) as they ignore the dynamic nature of FDI. 
In column 2 we therefore include the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient of 
the dtt_dummy variable cannot be directly compared to the one from the static model 
because in the dynamic model it merely represents the short-run effect, which is 
estimated at around 9.7 percent. The long-run effect needs to take into account the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and is estimated at around 31 percent. 
The dynamic long-run effect of DTTs is thus not much different from the static effect, 
and is in fact slightly higher. 
Fixed-effects estimations with the lagged dependent variable included suffers 
from some Nickell (1981) bias, which only vanishes as T, the number of time periods 
of the panel, becomes large. To eliminate this bias, we use Arellano and Bond’s 
(1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. It has the additional 
advantage that the endogeneity of variables can be explicitly taken into account. 
There is the possibility that the estimated effect of dtt_dummy suffers from reverse 
causality bias: rather than the successful conclusion of DTTs increasing bilateral FDI, 
countries may conclude DTTs with whom they have a large bilateral FDI stock. The 
same argument applies to the conclusion of BITs. 
Unfortunately, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator also has a 
disadvantage. This estimator removes any correlation between the explanatory 
variables and fixed effects by first differencing the variables. For a dummy variable, 
which is zero at first and then always one from the year the DTT becomes effective 
onwards (until its possible termination), this creates the problem that the first 
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differenced variable is zero at first, is one only in the year of becoming effective and 
zero again in all subsequent years. In other words, by first differencing the dtt_dummy 
variable, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator can only estimate an effect of DTTs 
in the first year of becoming effective. This is not the effect we are interested in. 
Instead, we want to know the effect that a DTT exerts over its entire lifetime. To 
overcome this problem, we replace the dtt_dummy with a variable that measures the 
years passed since becoming effective, with the year of conclusion set to one 
(dtt_age). In first differences, this new variable is zero for all years prior to becoming 
effective and then one for all years from becoming effective onwards (until its 
possible termination).12 In non-reported estimates we tested, but failed to find 
evidence for a non-linear effect of treaty age on FDI. 
Column 3 presents our GMM estimation results. Note that the estimation 
results are not directly comparable to the static or dynamic fixed-effects results since 
the relevant variable is no longer the existence of a DTT, but the number of years 
since a DTT has been effective. Importantly, however, once we eliminate the Nickell 
bias and control for endogeneity, the results suggest that (the age of) a DTT still has a 
positive effect on the bilateral FDI stock. 
We have undertaken a large number of additional estimations to check 
whether our results are robust toward changes in the sample. To keep the exposition 
simple, we only report the estimated coefficients of the dtt_dummy variable for all 
three model specifications. In row 1 of table 3 we restrict the sample to a similar 
sample as the one contained in Blonigen and Davies (2005), while row 2 does the 
                                                 
12
 Note that, contrary to FE estimations with dtt_dummy as the explanatory variable, old treaties, i.e. 
treaties concluded before the start of our sample period, will have an effect with the dtt_age variable in 
the GMM estimations. This is not really problematic, however, since in GMM estimations the dtt_age 
variable is explicitly treated as endogenous. That is, similar to the lagged dependent variable, the first-
differenced dtt_age and bit_age variables are instrumented with their levels lagged two or more 
periods. 
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same for the sample used in Egger et al. (2006). If our argument is correct that non-
representative sample size is the main reason for the finding in the extant literature 
that DTTs do not have a positive effect on FDI, then our DTT variables should no 
longer be positive and statistically significant in these estimations. This is in fact the 
case, with the exception of the GMM estimations for the sample used in Egger et al. 
(2006). This therefore mirrors the existing results and buttresses our argument that 
sample size matters. 
 
insert table 3 around here 
 
To make our sample as representative as possible, we have, under certain 
conditions (see section 5 above), filled dyads which did not report any FDI stocks 
with values of zero. If they are in fact zero or close to zero, then this procedure is 
correct as these dyads belong to the relevant population. One might nevertheless be 
concerned that these observations drive our results. In row 3 of table 3 we therefore 
exclude all observations with FDI stock values of zero in our dependent variable. As 
can be seen, while the estimated coefficients become smaller in the static and the 
GMM estimations compared to the full sample, they remain positive and statistically 
significant with the exception of the static estimation, in which case the estimated 
coefficient is almost significant, however (p-value of 0.106). 
In row 4 we restrict the sample to developing host countries only, for which 
any potential increase in FDI is relatively more important given the likely loss in tax 
revenue following the conclusion of a DTT.13 DTTs continue to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on bilateral FDI stocks. In row 5, we further restrict the 
                                                 
13
 Developed countries are defined as US, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
Developing countries are all the other countries. 
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sample to developed source countries. With the exception of the FE dynamic 
estimation, DTTs continue to exert a positive effect on FDI. 
In rows 6 and 7 we constrain the sample to middle- and low-income 
developing host countries, following World Bank (2008) classification. DTTs seem to 
have a positive effect in both sub-samples, even if for low-income countries the 
coefficient of dtt_dummy is marginally insignificant in the dynamic FE estimations. 
The sizes of the respective coefficients are relatively similar across the sub-samples 
and comparable to the sample with all developing host countries included. 
In rows 8 and 9 we exclude resource-intensive and transition countries from 
the sample of developing countries, respectively.14 Excluding these groups of 
countries does not change dramatically the estimated coefficients of dtt_dummy and 
dtt_age, respectively. They remain positive and statistically significant and while the 
coefficient size is somewhat smaller if resource-intensive countries are excluded 
compared to the results for the full developing country sample, the estimated 
confidence intervals of the two coefficients overlap to a large extent. 
 
7. Conclusion 
It is not surprising that policy-makers around the world are engaged in fierce 
competition for FDI, as host countries could benefit from activities of multinational 
enterprises through the inflow of additional capital, technology spillovers or increased 
competition. At least regarding policy instruments, it is still disputed how to 
effectively increase the attractiveness of a country for foreign investors. In this paper, 
                                                 
14
 A country is classified as resource-abundant if its resource rents, that is, energy plus mineral 
depletion in percent of GNI, are higher than 15 percent on average of the first three years in the sample 
(1978-1981). This corresponds to the World Bank (2006) criterion; however, data is not available for 
all countries, which may be problematic since countries in which FDI is likely to be resource-seeking 
are not classified as such (e.g., Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan). Transition countries are defined as the East 
European former Communist countries as well as the Russian Republic. 
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we examined one important policy instrument, namely, the impact of DTTs on FDI 
stocks in the host economy. Apart from using a relatively long time period, the main 
advantage of our empirical analysis is the inclusion of an unprecedented number of 
both host and source countries, which reduces the risk of distorted results due to a 
sample selection bias. 
After controlling for various determinants of bilateral FDI stocks, our results 
show that DTTs are indeed positively associated with foreign investment in the host 
country. The results hold for different specifications of the econometric model, 
including an instrumental variable GMM approach, and various sub-samples. Since 
the estimated coefficients for the DTT variable are not only statistically significant, 
but also substantively important, our results indicate that policymakers have resorted 
to an effective means to promote FDI by concluding DTTs. 
However, alongside the favourable impact of DTTs on FDI stocks, the 
potential negative effects of DTTs also have to be considered. As we have pointed 
out, negotiating a DTT could absorb valuable administrative resources, which 
particularly applies to (low-income) developing countries. Likewise, depending on the 
final outcome of the negotiations on the DTT, host countries potentially face losses in 
tax revenues. For many developing countries, these losses are not offset by tax 
reductions for domestic investors abroad due to the prevailing asymmetry in FDI 
stocks. As a consequence, each country should carefully ponder the pros and cons of 
negotiating a DTT.  
In terms of future research, it would be clearly useful to weigh the costs and 
benefits of concluding a tax treaty from a policy perspective. Based on our findings, 
two opposing effects regarding tax income could occur: on the one hand, if the agreed 
withholding taxes are lower than the existing corporate tax rate, the tax authority 
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collects less from a single company; however, as the DTT attracts more FDI, overall 
tax revenues might rise. In addition, particularly developing countries could profit 
from the beneficial impact of the foreign capital mentioned above. Obviously, this 
type of analysis should be performed at a country level, as the analysis can be quite 
complex. 
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Table 1. Descriptive variable statistics. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ln FDI stock 33,066 1.13 4.14 -2.30 12.53 
dtt_dummy 33,066 0.35 0.48 0 1 
dtt_age 33,066 7.24 12.68 0 79 
bit_dummy 33,066 0.16 0.36 0 1 
bit_age 33,066 1.58 5.00 0 43 
ln GDP (host) 33,066 24.21 2.09 19.64 30.02 
ln GDP p.c. (host) 33,066 7.71 1.57 4.47 10.57 
lninflation (host) 33,066 2.47 1.65 -4.07 10.11 
trade openness (host) 33,066 70.35 36.29 10.08 233.94 
regional trade agreement 33,066 0.15 0.35 0 1 
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Table 2. Main estimation results. 
 
 FE static FE dynamic Arellano-Bond 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
dtt_dummy 0.246 0.094  
 (2.83)*** (2.18)**  
dtt_age   0.090 
   (9.57)*** 
bit_dummy 0.303 0.071  
 (4.05)*** (2.34)**  
bit_age   0.019 
   (2.15)** 
ln FDI stock (t-1)  0.679 0.266 
  (24.27)*** (3.96)*** 
ln GDP 0.180 0.081 0.165 
 (4.35)*** (4.34)*** (6.34)*** 
ln GDP p.c. 0.848 0.249 -0.089 
 (7.10)*** (4.46)*** (1.42) 
ln inflation -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 
 (1.74)* (2.08)** (1.88)* 
trade openness 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (1.47) (1.88)* (0.94) 
regional trade agreement 0.323 0.085 0.040 
 (3.53)*** (2.49)** (1.22) 
Observations 33,066 28,965 25,714 
Number of dyads 2,937 2,676 2,515 
R-squared 0.20 0.56  
Test no second-order 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
  -0.67 
(0.51) 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered on country dyads. Constant and year-specific time 
dummies included, but coefficients not reported. * statistically significant at 0.1  
** 0.05  *** 0.01 level. The results for the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation refer to 
robust one-step estimates; t- and z-values reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Robustness test results. 
 FE static FE dynamic Arellano-
Bond GMM 
 dummy dummy treaty age 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Blonigen and Davies (2005) -0.1048 0.1112 0.0722 
      sample (1982-1992) (-0.501) (0.876) (1.384) 
Egger et al. (2006) sample -0.2243 -0.0852 0.0689*** 
      (1985-2000) (-0.571) (-0.344) (2.647) 
Excluding dyads of zero FDI 0.1256 0.0951* 0.0351*** 
 (1.620) (1.793) (3.480) 
Developing host countries 0.3839*** 0.0842*** 0.0328*** 
 (4.872) (2.908) (4.335) 
Developing host countries 0.4027*** -0.2385 0.1169** 
  & developed source countries (4.487) (-1.235) (2.305) 
Middle-income countries 0.5095*** 0.0912** 0.0191*** 
 (4.997) (2.492) (2.888) 
Low-income countries 0.2012* 0.0844 0.0478*** 
 (1.840) (1.581) (3.578) 
Developing countries, excl.  0.2930*** 0.0519* 0.0337*** 
      resource-intens. countries (3.674) (1.783) (3.700) 
Developing countries, excl.  0.4054*** 0.0846*** 0.0297*** 
      transition countries (4.811) (2.850) (3.979) 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered on country dyads. Constant and year-specific time 
dummies included, but coefficients not reported. * statistically significant at 0.1  
** 0.05  *** 0.01 level. Results on Arellano-Bond tests for second-order 
autocorrelation not reported, but tests fail to reject the hypothesis of no such 
correlation. 
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Figure 1: Average annual number of DTTs concerning income and capital taxation: 
new effective treaties, terminated treaties, and total number of treaties in force (right-
hand scale), 1946-2007. 
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Figure 2: Total DTTs concluded by the end of 2006 (by country groups). 
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Appendix 
List of source countries: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea 
(Republic of), Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
Venezuela 
Note: Developing source countries in italics. 
 
List of host countries: 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (Republic 
of), Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Note: Developing host countries in italics. 
